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NOTES
PULLING THE PLUG: CONTROVERSIAL
PROGRAMMING ON PUBLIC ACCESS
TELEVISION AND THE CABLE
TELEVISION CONSUMER PROTECTION
AND COMPETITION ACT OF 1992
INTRODUCTION

The concept was noble: the establishment of cable channels
for the exclusive use of the public would provide an unrestricted
forum for voicing local concerns, creative programming, and informative debate. Public access television would be the "electronic
soapbox" of the future - a haven for free speech in a world of
regulated media.1 Unfortunately, these lofty ideals have been
tarnished in recent years by the proliferation of public access
programs featuring overt racism or graphic depictions of sexual
conduct. In a typically inappropriate response, Congress has recently given cable operators the unilateral power to prohibit certain public access programming under section 10(c) of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
(1992 Cable Act). 2 What is more troubling than section 10(c)'s
potential impact on public access television is its blatant encroachment on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.3
This Note begins by providing background information on
cable television. Second, it traces the historical development of
public access television, addresses the censorship provisions of the
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (1984 Cable Act),4 and
discusses the recent rise in controversial programming on public
access. This includes a review of various programs which have

1. Wally Mueller, Controversial Programmingon Cable Television's Public Access Channels: The Limits of Governmental Response, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 1051

(1989). "Public access channels offer citizens the unprecedented opportunity to express themselves over the powerful medium of television - free from the control of
the government or media conglomerates." Id.
2. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
3. The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that, "Congress shall

make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press..
amend. I.

. ." U.S.

CONST.

4. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1985).
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recently been the subjects of debate across the country. Third, this
Note examines section 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act. As an integral
part of this discussion, this Note identifies and analyzes the problems with current obscenity and indecency standards, particularly
when applied in the unique context of public access. Finally, this
Note proposes that section 10(c) be eliminated in favor of a
"lockbox" approach, thus transferring the misplaced power of
censorship from the cable operator to the cable subscriber. This
Note concludes that the current version of section 10(c) of the
1992 Cable Act is not only unworkable for the cable operator, but
violative of the freedoms guaranteed under the First Amendment.
I. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TELEVISION

In discussing the evolution of public access television, this
section first traces the development of cable television. This section then addresses the various federal regulations and judicial
decisions which together formed the basis for the emergence of
public access. Finally, this section outlines the growth of public
access itself and includes a discussion of the relevant provisions of
the 1984 and 1992 Cable Acts.
A. Development of Cable Television

The predecessors of modern cable television, called community antenna television (CATV) systems, began sprouting up around
the United States in the late 1940s.' These primitive systems
were much different than the advanced satellite systems in use today. CATV systems retransmitted a small number of broadcast
signals to remote areas of the country.6
However, rapid advancements in technology quickly thrust
CATV into the future. First, channel capacity increased dramatically.7 While the early systems could handle only three or five
channels, by the early 1980s many systems were able to accommodate well over sixty channels.' Second, the ability to broadcast
original programming became available to CATV operators.'
5. Mueller, supra note 1, at 1052-58.
6. Id. at 1053. CATV systems transmit television signals from a central location directly to the viewer's television. Robert Schwartz, Public Access to Cable
Television, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1010 (1982). The signals are transmitted by
wire, much like a telephone transmission. Id.
7. Improvements in technology increased the channel capacity of single cable
systems to 12 channels in the 1960s, then to 20 channels in the early 1970s, to 36

channels in the late 1970s, and to a 54-channel capacity in the early 1980s.
Mueller, supra note 1, at 1054.
8. Id. A 1983 sample of 1227 cable systems across the Midwest revealed that
24 systems had a capacity for more than 60 channels. Id. Some state-of-the-art
systems now have the capacity for more than 100 channels. Id.

9. Id. "The term 'cablecasting' means programming which is distributed on a

1995]

ControversialProgrammingon Public Access

Along with the limited capabilities of the early systems, the term
"CATV" quickly became outdated and such systems are now generally referred to as "cable television." 10
The cable television industry has rapidly grown into a multibillion dollar industry comprised of more than 8,000 systems
across the nation." Over sixty percent of American households
with televisions currently subscribe to basic cable television service.12 As the industry has grown, the federal government has
gradually increased its regulation of the cable television medium.
A basic understanding of the historical development of these regulations provides a useful starting point for an examination of

public access as it exists today.
B. Federal Regulation of Cable Television
Federal regulation of cable television can be traced back to
the Communications Act of 1934.13 The Act created the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), which was given control over
all forms of electrical communication." Although the Act did not

CATV system which has been originated by the CATV operator or by another entity, exclusive of broadcast signals carried on the system." Midwest Video Corp. v.
United States, 441 F.2d 1322, 1324 (8th Cir. 1971) (quoting 47 C.F.R. § 74.1101(j)
(1970)), reu'd, 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
10. "Because of the broader functions to be served by such facilities in the fu-

ture," the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted the "more inclusive
term cable television systems." Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d
141, 144 n.9 (1972). Accordingly, CATV operators are now known as "cable operators." The term cable operator is defined as:
[Amny person or group or persons (A) who provides cable service over a cable
system and directly or through one or more affiliates owns a significant interest in such cable system, or (B) who otherwise controls or is responsible
for, through any arrangement, the management and operation of a cable system.
FCC Report and Order, available in LEXIS, 1985 F.C.C. LEXIS 3475, at 3-4
(1985).
11. Mueller, supra note 1, at 1054.
12. Pat Widder, For Many, Cable Just Got Cheaper, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1993, at
1. As of 1992, over 57 million households received basic cable television service. Id.
Moreover, the substantial increase in cable subscribers which has taken place over
the past decade is likely to continue indefinitely. See Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2(a)(3), 106 Stat.
1460 (1992) (finding that the percentage of households which subscribe to cable
will continue to increase).
13. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
14. The Communications Act of 1934 created the FCC:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide
wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges ... and for the purpose of securing a more effective execution of this
policy by centralizing authority with respect to ...wire and radio communi-
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expressly include cable television in its provisions, 5 Congress
clearly intended that such communications technology be included
within the FCC's jurisdiction.1"
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court recognized
Congress' intent in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.'7
The Court held that the FCC had the authority to regulate cable
under section 2(1) of the Act, I" but restricted this power to regulation which is "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance
of the [FCC's] various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting."'9

In 1969, less than a year after Southwestern, the FCC promulgated a rule requiring CATV systems having more than 3,500
subscribers to broadcast original programming.2" In United
States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), Midwest Video
Corporation, a CATV operator, challenged the rule on the ground
that the FCC was not authorized to regulate cable in this capacity.2 ' However, the Supreme Court upheld the origination rule
under the "reasonably ancillary" standard set forth in Southwestern, thus expanding the authority of the FCC to regulate cable
television.22 Midwest Video I provided the basis for the promul-

cation, there is created a commission to be known as the "Federal Communications Commission."
Id. § 151.

15. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1012. Cable television did not exist when the
Communications Act was enacted in 1934. Id.
16. Id. In FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., the Supreme Court stated that although
the Communications Act of 1934 preceded the advent of cable, "it is clear that
Congress meant to confer %broadauthority' on the Commission." 440 U.S. 689, 696
(1979) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934)).
17. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
18. Id. at 178. The Supreme Court held that the FCC's authority, under the
Communications Act, to regulate "all interstate communication ... by wire or
radio" includes CATV (cable) systems. Id.
19. Id. The Supreme Court stated that "[t]here is no need here to detail the limits of the [FCCI's authority to regulate [cable]. It is enough to emphasize that the
authority which we recognize ... is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of the [FCC]'s various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting."Id. (emphasis added).
20. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111 (a) (1970) (repealed 1974). CATV systems which failed
to comply with the rule were proscribed from carrying the signal of any broadcast
station. Id.
21. 406 U.S. 649 (1972) [hereinafter Midwest Video A1.
22. Id. at 669. A five Justice majority held that "the regulation preserves and
enhances the integrity of broadcast signals and therefore is 'reasonably ancillary to
the effective performance of the [FCC]'s various responsibilities for the regulation
of television broadcasting." Id. at 670 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177 (1968)). The Court concluded that the "program-orientation rule [was] within the Commission's authority recognized in Southwestern." Id.
at 670.
Nevertheless, the FCC subsequently repealed the mandatory origination rule
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gation of a series of extensive regulations which govern the cable
television industry today.23 Accordingly, the following discussion
relates to the regulations which brought public access television
into existence.
C. Development of Public Access
Public access channels are those which are "set aside by the

cable operator for exclusive use by local individuals and community groups."24 While the concept of public access television began
as a few local experiments in the late 1960s,25 modern public access has developed through contemporary federal regulation. In
1972, the Federal Communications Commission broke new ground
for public access with the release of its Cable Television Report
and Order. 2' For the first time, cable system operators were re27
quired to provide channels for the exclusive use of the public.
However, in 1979, the Supreme Court struck down the mandatory
access rules in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II).
Nevertheless, many cable operators continued to maintain public
access channels on their systems.29 The next five years brought a
brief period of status quo with respect to cable television regulation. However, the biggest changes were yet to come.

in 1974. See 39 Fed. Reg. 43,302 (1974). Citing poor economic conditions and an
overly optimistic assessment of origination's appeal, the FCC determined "that the
mandatory origination scheme would not be the most effective method for providing an outlet for local viewpoints." Mueller, supra note 1, at 1072. The FCC decided that access channels would be a more effective means of achieving this goal. Id.
23. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 1014 (stating that "Midwest I firmly established
the FCC's authority to regulate cable television").
24. Mueller, supra note 1, at 1060.
25. Id. at 1061. One of the first reported uses of public access occurred in 1968,
when a cable operator in Dale City, Virginia began airing community programming
on his local origination channel. Id. However, lack of funding brought the so-called
"Dale City Experiment" to an abrupt end in early 1970. Id.
26. Cable Television Report and Order, supra note 10, at 141.
27. The rules required that every new cable system in the top 100 markets
provide one channel each for public, governmental, educational, and leased access
programming. Id. at 192.
28. 440 U.S. 689 (1979). The Supreme Court distinguished its previous holding
in Midwest Video I by concluding that "the origination rule did not abrogate the
cable operators' control over the composition of their programming, as do the access rules." Id. at 700. Thus, the Court held that the access rules were beyond the
jurisdiction of the FCC. Mueller, supra note 1, at 1073.
29. Mueller, supra note 1, at 1074. Approximately 2,000 public access channels
are currently in operation across the nation. Laura A. Kiernan, "Public Access"
Tests Limits of TV Tolerance; Cable Communities Grapple With Issues, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1992, Metro/Region, at 23.
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1. The Cable CommunicationsPolicy Act of 1984
In 1984, Congress specifically addressed public access for the
first time by passing the Cable Communications Policy Act (1984
Cable Act). 30 The 1984 Cable Act amended the Cable Communications Act of 1934 by adding Title VI, entitled "Cable Communications," under which the FCC regulates all cable communications.3 ' The intent of the 1984 Cable Act, as stated in the FCC's
1985 Report and Order, was "to establish a national policy that
encourages the growth and development of cable television services and assures that cable systems are responsive to the needs and
interests of the local communities they serve." 2 The Act included
a comprehensive array of rules dealing with virtually every conceivable aspect of cable television."3
Section 611(e) of the 1984 Cable Act addressed the power to
control the content of access programming.3 4 Section 611(e) expressly prohibited cable operators from "exercis[ing] any editorial
control over any public, educational, or governmental use of channel capacity provided pursuant to this section."3 ' However, sec-

30. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1985).
31. FCC Report and Order, supra note 10, at 3-4.
32. Id. The six purposes of the 1984 Cable Act were set forth in § 601:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications;
(2) establish franchise procedures and standards which encourage the
growth and development of cable systems and which assure that cable systems are responsive to the needs and interests of the local community;
(3) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and Local authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems;
(4) assure that cable communications provide and are encouraged to provide
the widest possible diversity of information sources and services to the public;
(5) establish an orderly process for franchise renewal which protects cable
operators against unfair denials of renewal where the operator's past performance and proposal for future performance meet the standards established by this subchapter; and
(6) promote competition in cable communications and minimize unnecessary
regulation that would impose and undue economic burden on cable systems.
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (1985).
33. The 1984 Cable Act covered such diverse areas as pole attachments (§ 4),
ownership restrictions (§ 613), franchise requirements and fees (§§ 621, 622), rate
regulation (§ 623), and unauthorized reception (§ 633). Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1985).
34. Id. § 531(e).
35. Id. However, § 624 of the 1984 Cable Act provided that "[i]n order to restrict
the viewing of programming which is obscene or indecent, upon the request of a
subscriber, a cable operator shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the
subscriber can prohibit viewing of a particular cable service during periods selected
by that subscriber." Id. § 544. It is important to note that § 624 did not apply to
access channels. FCC Report and Order, supra note 10, at 3-4. The devices referred
to in this provision are commonly known as "lockboxes." For a discussion of lockbox
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tion 639, entitled "Obscene Programming," provided that persons
transmitting obscene material over cable systems would be subject
to substantial fines and/or imprisonment. 36 Thus, the 1984 Cable
Act expressly prohibited the cable operator from censoring public
access programming while, at the same time, providing that the
operator could be punished for broadcasting obscene material over
a public access channel.
The obscenity provisions of the 1984 Cable Act were the subject of litigation in Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Missouri.a* In Missouri Knights, the Ku Klux Klan
(KKK) brought an action seeking to enjoin the city from
eliminating its only public access channel.3" After the KKK had
requested weekly time on the access channel to air a series of
programs, 9 the cable franchisee and city officials adopted a plan
which would eliminate the channel and replace it with one subject
to their editorial control.4 ° The KKK alleged that the elimination
of the channel violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as
well as section 611(e) of the 1984 Cable Act. 4' The court denied
Kansas City's motion to dismiss, holding that there was a private
right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 198342 for violations of section
611(e) of the Act. 43 Shortly after this decision, Kansas City officials restored the channel." Thus, Missouri Knights lent judicial
support to the asserted right of public access producers to have
virtually unrestricted use of the medium pursuant to the 1984
Cable Act.45
technology, see infra Part III of this Note.
36. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 559. Section 639
provided: "Whoever transmits over any cable system any matter which is obscene
or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution of the United States shall be fined

not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id.
37. Missouri Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kansas City, Mo., 723 F. Supp.
1347 (W.D. Mo. 1989). Given the confusion surrounding the constitutional definition of obscenity, it was inevitable that the censorship provisions of the 1984 Cable
Act would lead to litigation.
38. Id. at 1350-51.
39. The 45 programs, titled "Race and Reason," offered political and social commentary from a "racialist" standpoint. Id. at 1349. For a further discussion of
"Race and Reason," see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
40. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1350.
41. Id. Section 611(e) prohibited cable operators from exercising editorial control over access channels. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §
531(e) (1985).
42. Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute ...

[or] regulation ...

of any state ...

subjects or causes to be subjected any

citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law [or]
suit in equity." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
43. Missouri Knights, 723 F. Supp. at 1354.
44. Mueller, supra note 1, at 10.
45. However, the 1984 Cable Act restricts the freedom from editorial control to
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2. ControversialProgrammingSince the 1984 Cable Act

During the years since Congress put the 1984 Cable Act into
effect, many producers have taken the freedoms of public access to
the extreme. The following are but a few examples of the many
controversial programs which have been aired in recent years on
public access channels across the country:
"Infosex" - Two men engage in oral sex, a man masturbates,
and various other sexual acts between men are depicted.46
"Lifestyles of the Up and Coming" - Men pour buckets of ice
into the bathing suits of women, the women wiggle in apparent
delight, then the host of the show attempts to talk female bystanders into taking off their clothes, often with success.47
"Race and Reason" - Tom Metzger, leader of the White Aryan Resistance (WAR), produces this popular half-hour talk show.
Host Herbert Poinsett, in full Nazi uniform, preaches hate and
violence against various minorities.48
"It's Time to Wake Up" - Ta-Har, High Priest of the Black
Israelites, swings a baseball bat while threatening to "[beat] the
hell out of you white people. We're going to take your little children and dash them against the stones [and] rape and ravish your
white women."49
"The Worst Show" - Host instructs viewers on the best
methods of suicide. 50
programming which is not obscene. See supra note 36 (discussing § 639 of the 1984
Cable Act).
46. Sue Anne Pressley, Letter From Texas; Cable Access ProgramTests Limits of
Obscenity, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 1993. After "Infosex" premiered on the public
access station in Austin, Texas, the producer of the show was suspended. Id. In
addition, a Travis County attorney has initiated a criminal investigation of
"Infosex," and the video may be submitted to a grand jury to determine if it violated obscenity laws. Id.
47. Howard Troxler, Bad Taste? Evil? Maybe. But Who Gets to Say?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at lB.
48. Bill Duryea & Brad Snyder, They Preach Hate on Public Access TV, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 12, 1993, at 1A.
For white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and the White
Aryan Resistance - groups long shunned by the mainstream media - public access is a technological promised land. . . . "You can say whatever you
want without being censored," Metzger said. "We can reach hundreds of
thousands of people and that's more than we could do at any rallies or
speeches on the street."
Id.
49. Joseph Berger, Forum for Bigotry? Fringe Groups on TV, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 1993, § 1, at 29. Lawyers representing the American Civil Liberties Union do
not think that even these blatant threats of violence against women and children
could be banned because "they do not pose the kind of imminent threat of violence
that... is the only grounds for prohibition under Supreme Court interpretations of
the First Amendment." Id.
50. David McLemore, Trying to Pull the Plug; San Antonio Cable TV Suicide

1995]

Controversial Programmingon Public Access

"Morbid Underground" - Host of death-metal music show
airs a video of a punk-rock "musician" defecating and urinating on
stage. 5
Even more shocking than the programs themselves is the fact
that such content is often aired during early hours when children
are likely to be watching.52 Furthermore, this type of programming has not been limited to a few isolated productions. In a 1991
report, the Anti-Defamation League identified fifty-seven programs preaching bigotry which have run on public access channels, reaching a potential audience of tens, if not hundreds, of
thousands.5 3
Predictably, the increase in controversial programming on
public access has caused a great deal of public uproar.' As a re-

Guide Angers Many, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 14, 1992, at 1A. In 1991, an
episode of "The Worst Show" demonstrated how to build an acid bomb. Id. A week
later, an acid bomb exploded in the driveway of a San Antonio police officer's
home. Id.
51. Bill Duryea, Cable TV Producer Off Hook, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 7,
1993, at lB. The producer/host of "Morbid Underground" could not be prosecuted
because "excretory conduct is not specifically prohibited in Florida; the dissemination of obscene videotapes is not against the law; and the obscenity statute does
not clearly define 'prurient interest,' a cornerstone of most obscenity law." Id.
52. Berger, supra note 49, at 29; see also Jan Fuglaar, Get Porn of Access Houston, Hous. CHRON., July 26, 1993, at A15 (reporting that access programming
which featured full frontal nudity aired during early evening hours, "a prime viewing time for young children who flip through the channels").
53. IRWIN SUALL ET AL., ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, ELECTRONic HATE: BIGOTRY COMES TO TV 2 (1991). Hate groups have embraced public access
which enables them to reach unprecedented numbers of American viewers. Id. at 1.
The report also notes that the use of the television medium lends an air of legitimacy to racial and religious bigotry. Id. In addition to the increased use of public
access, hate groups have begun to employ other sophisticated technology to better
spread their message, including computer bulletin boards, telephone hotlines, and
talk show appearances. Id.
Tom Metzger is perhaps the most prolific producer of hate programming. A
former Grand Dragon of the California Ku Klux Klan, Metzger claims to have
produced programs similar to "Race and Reason" on over 60 cable systems in 40
cities. Michael Granbury, Film Spurns Review of Metzger's Probation, L.A. TIMES,
June 5, 1992, Metro, at B1. Authorities decided to review a Nazi propaganda film
produced by Tom Metzger for public access to determine whether he violated the
terms of a court-ordered probation that followed his conviction of a hate crime in
1991. Id.
54. See, e.g., Michael Levy, Explicit Movie Triggers End of "Dino,Rocco" - Airing of PornographyViolates Cable Contract, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 25, 1993, Local, at 1
(reporting that after "Dino and Rocco's Back Alley" aired on a Buffalo, New York
public access station, 25 complaints were phoned in); Rob Polner, TV Nazi Draws
Viewer's Fire, NEWSDAY, May 21, 1993, at 3 (reporting that about 100 people
phoned Manhattan Community Access following a local news report on "Race and
Reason" and demanded that it be taken off the air). The host of the weekly series,
Herbert Poinsett, said that the only reason that his show is met with such opposition in New York is because "anything the Jews don't believe with [sic] is controversy." Id.; see also Tom Scherberger, Meet the Bad Boys of PublicAccess, ST. PE-
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sult, cable operators have employed various methods in an indirect pursuit of editorial control over public access programming.
These methods have included the airing of disclaimers and warnings before all access programs," pre-screening videos and rescheduling potentially offensive content at later hours,5" and encouraging counter-programming." Local governments have also
attempted to gain some level of control over public access programming. Some city governments have threatened to withdraw
funding for public access," while others have tried to dictate policy under the terms of their franchise agreements with cable operators.59 Nevertheless, section 611(e) of the 1984 Cable Act presented a substantial obstacle to any attempts at censorship. 0
Further legislation was inevitable, and it came in the form of section 10(c) of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992.61

3. The Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
In recognition of the difficulty which cable operators encountered in regulating the content of access programming, Congress
enacted section 10 of the 1992 Cable Act.62 Section 10 defines the
1B (stating that "[wihen Tampa's public access
channels started showing naked women in prime time... the phone lines at the
county courthouse began to light up").
55. R.A. Dyer, Warner Cable Disclaimers Draw Objections; Producers Demand
Freedom of Speech, HouS. CHRON., July 28, 1993, at A17. Warner Cable has started to air disclaimers before every video shown on its public access channel, regardless of content. Id.
56. R.A. Dyer, TV Channel CensorshipIs Denied, Hous. CHRON., July 31, 1993,
at A34. Warner has also adopted a new policy to pre-screen all public access programming and to reschedule potentially offensive programs for later hours. Id.
57. "The best thing that a Jewish community can do is counter-program," according to the programming director for Jones Intercable in Tampa, Florida, "[blut
they don't seem to want to do that." Duryea & Snyder, supra note 48, at IA. According to a report issued by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, counterprogramming is generally welcomed by cable operators, and has even been encourTERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992, at

aged in some instances. SUALL ET AL., supra note 53, at 8.
58. Karen Welch, Council Censors Public Access Television, BUFF. NEWS, July

14, 1993, at 2. The Buffalo Common Council recently threatened to withdraw its
funding for the local public access station unless it stopped airing "Dino and
Rocco's Back Alley Show". Id.
59. R.A. Dyer, Warner Puts Explicit Videos In Late Time Slot, Hous. CHRON.,
July 14, 1993, at A21. The franchise agreement between Warner Cable and the city
of Houston provides "that the city shall adopt policies and procedures for the use of
the public ...

access channel." Id.

60. See supra text accompanying note 35 (stating that § 611(e) expressly prohibited cable operators from exercising editorial control over PEG channels).
61. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
62. The executive director of the Justice Department's National Obscenity Enforcement Unit testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1988 that "[the
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rights of a cable operator regarding the prohibition of "indecent"63 programming on both commercial leased access" and
public, educational, and governmental (PEG) access channels.
Subsection (c) of section 10 sets forth three categories of program-

ming which are subject to censorship. This provision now authorizes operators to prohibit "[11 programming which contains obscene materials, [2] sexually explicit conduct, or [3] material pro-

moting or soliciting unlawful conduct" on PEG channels.65
The third category of programming prohibited under section
10(c), that which contains "material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct," may present its own problems; 6 they are, however,
beyond the scope of this Note. However, as the next section of this
Note demonstrates, the implementation of the first two categories

Cable Communications Policy Act [of 19841 is so muddled with respect to obscenity
that legislation is needed to clear up the matter." Robert Homan, Justice Dept.
Backs Cable 'Obscenity' Curbs, ELEC. MEDIA, June 13, 1988, at 3.
63. "Indecent" programming is defined in § 10(a) of the 1992 Cable Act. For a
discussion of § 10(a), see infra note 128.
64. Commercial leased access channels differ from public access channels in
that cable operators charge leased access users an hourly fee for airtime. Mueller,
supra note 1, at 1066. In addition, § 612(b) of the Communications Act requires
operators of cable systems with 36 or more channels to provide commercial leased
access channels. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 532(b)
(1985). However, cable operators are no longer required to provide public access
channels. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (stating that Midwest Video II
struck down the mandatory access rules in 1979). Nevertheless, franchising authorities may require that an operator provide access channels under § 531(b) of
the 1984 Cable Act. Mueller, supra note 1, at 1081. A franchising authority is defined as "any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State, or local law to
grant a franchise." Id. at 1081 n.208 (quoting § 522(9) of the 1984 Cable Act).
65. Section 10(c) provides:
(c) Prohibits System Use. Within 180 days following the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Communications Commission shall promulgate
such regulations as may be necessary to enable a cable operator of a cable
system to prohibit the use, on such system, of any channel capacity of any
public, educational, or governmental access facility for any programming
which contains obscene material, sexually explicit conduct, or material soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct.
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (emphasis added).
66. In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 2638, I 16-17
(1993) [hereinafter Second Report and Order] (discussing the application of the
term material "soliciting or promoting unlawful conduct"); see also Hess v. Indiana,
414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam). In Hess, the Supreme Court set forth the requirements for speech which may be prohibited as having a tendency to lead to violence, stating that:
[Uinder our decisions, the constitutional guarantees of free speech do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. (emphasis added).
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of prohibited programming under section 10(c) will be extremely
difficult, if not impossible.

II. PROBLEMS WITH THE CENSORSHIP PROVISIONS OF THE 1992
CABLE ACT

This section first addresses various problems associated with
the standards which govern the obscenity provision of section
10(c). This includes both an analysis of the problems with obscenity law in general, and as applied under section 10(c). This section

then turns to the sexually explicit conduct provision of section
10(c) and concludes that the provision is improperly applied to
public access.
A. The Vague Law of Obscenity
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that,
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press . . .. "7 The debate surrounding the prohibition of
speech, in its various forms, is as old as the First Amendment
itself. Throughout American jurisprudence, the courts have struggled to determine which types of speech, if any, may be prohibited
by law.68 Despite extensive litigation of speech-related issues, the
Supreme Court has recognized only three categories of speech
which may be prohibited: (1) "obscenity";69 (2) "indecency";7"
and (3) speech which advocates, and is directed towards inciting
or producing, imminent unlawful conduct.7 '
Pursuant to the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC subsequently pro-

67. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

68. "Defining obscenity has been, and continues to be, a most difficult task. The
judicial effort to find an acceptable definition of obscenity constitutes one of the
longest and most arduous struggles in the history of American jurisprudence."
DANIEL S. MORETTI, OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY: THE LAW UNDER THE FIRST
AMENDMENT xi (1984).

69. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("This much has been categorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment."). However, the Court has failed to settle on a standard for obscenity.
See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966) (stating that material must be "utterly without redeeming social value" to classified as obscene);
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966) (deciding whether a publication is advertised "to appeal to the erotic interests of customers"); Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that "I know
[hard-core pornography) when I see it"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487
(1957) (concluding that "[o]bscene material is material which deals with sex in a
manner appealing to a prurient interest").
70. See infra note 120 (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of the FCC's
power to regulate indecent speech in Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
71. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973). See supra note 66 (setting forth
the Hess standard for prohibiting speech as having a tendency to lead to violence).
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mulgated rules implementing section 10(c). 72 With respect to the
obscenity provision of section 10(c), the FCC stated that "cable

operators should be guided by the Miller obscenity standard in
their determinations of what materials fit into [programming
74
which 'contains obscene materials']."" In Miller v. California,

the Supreme Court set forth a three-pronged test in yet another
attempt to define obscenity:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the
average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.75
The Court rejected the idea of a national standard for obscenity.76 Instead, the Court held that local communities should be
permitted to set their own standards to govern the first two

prongs of the Miller test." However, under the third prong of the
test, findings must be made pursuant to an objective "reasonable
person" standard.7 8
Justice Douglas dissented and criticized the Miller test as
vague, unworkable, and inherently subjective.79 He further noted
that the test did not give the public fair warning as to what constitutes obscenity." There is well-grounded support for Justice

72. See generally Second Report and Order, supra note 66.
73. Id. 13.
74. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
75. Id. at 24. The final inquiry of the Miller test, "whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," replaced the
preceding terminology that "a work must be 'utterly without redeeming social value.' DONALD E. LIVELY, MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAw 134 (1991) (citing Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418
(1966)).
76. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 31-34 (rejecting various arguments for a national
standard).
77. See id. at 32 (stating that "lilt is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound
to read the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or New York
City").
78. Id. "The proper inquiry is not whether an ordinary member of any given
community would find serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in allegedly obscene material, but whether a reasonable person would find such value in
the material, taken as a whole." Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
"Notwithstanding its operation, the [reasonable person] standard does not entirely
eliminate the problem of subjectivity insofar as all reasonable persons do not subscribe to like values or have the same sensitivities." LIVELY, supra note 75, at 134.
79. See generally Miller, 413 U.S. at 37-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing
various problems with the standards).
80. MORE'rrI, supra note 68, at 33. In his dissent, Justice Douglas stated, "To
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Douglas' criticisms. A two-year study conducted by the U.S. Commission on Obscenity and Pornography concluded:
These vague and highly subjective aesthetic, psychological and
moral tests do not provide meaningful guidance for law enforcement
officials, juries or courts. As a result, law is inconsistently and
sometimes erroneously applied and the distinctions made by courts
between prohibited and permissible materials often appear indefensible."'
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,s2 a companion case to Miller, was the first obscenity case to apply the Miller test. In Paris
Adult Theatre I, two local officials brought suit against the owners
and operators of an adult theatre in Georgia, seeking to enjoin the
showing of two allegedly obscene motion pictures in the
theatre.8 3 The trial judge dismissed the complaints, but the
Georgia Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that the
films were obscene and should.have been enjoined.' The United
send men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, construe, and
apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due process." Miller, 413 U.S. at 43-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81. Miller, 413 U.S. at 40 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting REPORT OF THE
COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 53 (1970)).
82. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).

83. Id. at 49-50. In 1970, the respondents filed civil complaints alleging that the
films in question, "Magic Mirror" and "It All Comes Out in the End," were obscene
under Georgia state law. Although the Georgia obscenity statute defined a criminal
offense, the exhibition of obscenity could be enjoined in a civil proceeding. Id. at 52.
The statute provided, in relevant part:
(a) A person commits the offense of distributing obscene materials when he
sells, lends, rents, leases, gives, advertises, publishes, exhibits or otherwise
disseminates to any person any obscene material of any description, knowing the obscene nature thereof, or who offers to do so, or who possesses such
material with the intent so to do ....
(b) Material is obscene if considered as a whole, applying community standards, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, that is, a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion, and utterly without redeeming
social value and if, in addition, it goes substantially beyond customary limits
of candor in describing or representing such matters ....
(d) A person convicted of distributing obscene material shall for the first
offense be punished as for a misdemeanor, and for any subsequent offense
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five
years, or by a fine not to exceed $5,000, or both.
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2101., reprinted in ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 52.
84. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 52-53. The trial judge stated that, although obscenity was established, "[ilt appears to the Court that the display of
these films in a commercial theatre when surrounded by requisite notice to the
public of this nature and by reasonable protection against the exposure of these
films to minors, is constitutionally permissible." Id. at 53. On appeal, the Georgia
Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the exhibition of such material is not
protected by the First Amendment, regardless of whether it is seen only by consenting adults. Id. (citing Slaton v. Paris Adult Theatre I, 185 S.E.2d 768, 770 (Ga.
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States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the
Georgia Supreme Couit in order to reevaluate the state obscenity
statute in light of the standards announced in Miller v. California.'

Justice Brennan strongly dissented from this holding and
engaged in a comprehensive critique of the Miller test."6 Given
that cable operators must use the Miller test in deciding whether
certain access programming is obscene, 7 Brennan's dissent provides a useful framework for analyzing the problems with the
obscenity provision of section 10(c).
Justice Brennan began by noting that "[n]o other aspect of
the First Amendment has, in recent years, demanded so substantial a commitment of our time, generated such disharmony of
views, and remained so resistant to the formulation of stable and
manageable standards."" Obscenity standards are unavoidably
deficient in that they are inherently vague. 9 The vagueness of
the Miller test gives rise to a number of distinct problems in its
application. 90
1. Lack of FairNotice
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Miller test does not
provide "fair notice" of exactly what materials are prohibited from
dissemination.9 1 Lack of fair notice is a problem normally associ-

1971).
85. Id. at 69 (stating that the State of Georgia could regulate the allegedly obscene material exhibited in petitioner's theatre, provided that the state laws complied with the First Amendment standards set forth in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973)).
86. See ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 73-114 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. See Second Report and Order, supra note 66, 1 13 (stating that the Miller
standards should guide the cable operator).
88. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan
concluded that the Supreme Court's ad hoc approach to obscenity, beginning with
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), jeopardized First Amendment rights
and should be abandoned. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 73-74 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). "We have failed to formulate a standard that sharply distinguishes
protected from unprotected speech, and ...we have resorted to [an] approach
which resolves cases as between the parties, but offers only the most obscure guidance to legislation, adjudication by other courts, and primary conduct." Id. at 83.
89. ParisAdult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 84. "Any effort to draw a constitutionally
acceptable boundary... must resort to such indefinite concepts as 'prurient interest,' 'patent offensiveness,' 'serious literary value,' and the like. The meaning of
these concept necessarily varies with the experience, outlook, and even idiosyncracies of the person defining them." Id.
90. Id. at 86 (stating that vagueness produces a number of distinct problems).
91. Id. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, criminal
laws must provide fair notice of "'what the State commands or forbids."' Id. (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)). "The underlying principle is
that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
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ated with vague laws which force potential offenders to guess
whether their conduct is unlawful. 92 However, it follows that the
individuals charged with enforcing vague laws also must guess
whether certain conduct is proscribed.93 Thus, cable operators
acting pursuant to section 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act will inevitably face the problem of uncertainty when deciding whether public
access programming is obscene. The FCC has stated that cable
operators should be "guided" by the Miller standards in determining whether programming is obscene. 94 However, an examination
of the three-prong Miller test reveals that it provides little, if any,
practical guidance to the cable operator.
The FCC has made a number of perplexing assumptions
relating to implementation of the first prong: that every cable
operator is an "average person"; that the operator knows what the
prevailing "contemporary community standards" happen to be;
and that the operator has the ability to eliminate any conflicting
subjectivity in the application of those standards in finding
whether the work "appeals to the prurient interest."9 5 The second prong, under which the cable operator must decide whether
the material is "patently offensive," is similarly troublesome.'
Again, the obvious problem with the use of this term is one of
inherent subjectivity. Plainly, what is offensive to one may not be
offensive to another. Therefore, cable operators will necessarily
have to rely on their personal likes and dislikes, morals, and
tastes. In order to apply the third prong, a cable operator must
not only act as a reasonable person would,97 but must also know
what constitutes serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. 98

reasonably understand to be proscribed." Id. at 87 (quoting United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954)).
92. In the area of First Amendment rights, this problem is often referred to as
"overbreadth." For a discussion of overbreadth, see infra Part II.A.2 of this Note.
93. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 87-88 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that insufficient notice results in an "utterly intolerable"
level of uncertainty, which not only compels potential offenders to guess whether
their conduct is illegal, but invites "arbitrary and erratic enforcement of the law").
94. Second Report and Order, supra note 66, 13.

95. The first prong of the Miller test is "whether 'the average person, applying
contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest. . . ." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).

96. The second prong of the Miller test is "whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applica-

ble state law ....
"Id.
97. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that the third prong of
the Miller test employs an objective reasonable person standard).

98. The final inquiry under the Miller test is "whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller, 413 U.S.

at 24.
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The Miller test was intended to guide the trier of fact in
obscenity cases, not to assist individual cable operators in deciding whether a particular access program should be prohibited."
It is unreasonable to expect cable operators, who are merely laymen in the area of obscenity law, to know whether certain programming constitutes obscenity.'0° In short, by placing the burden of prohibiting obscene programming on the cable operator, the
FCC has attempted to do the impossible.
2. Overbreadth
Justice Brennan identified a second, closely related problem
which has arisen out of the Supreme Court's obscenity decisions.
When one is forced to guess whether certain conduct will violate a
statute, the problem of "overbreadth" exists in that the fear of a
wrong guess often deters the exercise of fundamental rights.'
The chilling effect which Miller has had on the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms is particularly egregious since these are
among 10 2the most precious and important of all constitutional
rights.

The problems associated with overbreadth become especially
manifest when the Miller standards are applied in the context of
public access programming. The power of the cable operator to
censor programming will undoubtedly stifle the creativity of those
who choose to use the public access forum to express themselves.
Since there is no way to know in advance whether the cable operator will decide that a program is obscene, many public access
producers will be hesitant to submit material which has even a
remote possibility of being found offensive.' 3 In this respect,
99. The introduction to the Miller test explicitly states, "The basic guidelines for
the trier of fact must be .... " Id. (emphasis added).
100. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 86 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). "[No person, not even the most learned judge much less a layman, is
capable of knowing in advance of an ultimate decision in his particular case by [the
Supreme] Court whether certain material comes within the area of 'obscenity'. ... "
Id. at 87 (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 480-81 (1966) (Black,
J., dissenting)).
101. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (Black, J. dissenting):
[Tihe 'vice of vagueness' is especially pernicious where legislative power over
an area involving speech ... is involved ....
For a statute to be broad
enough to support infringement of speech ... against the unequivocal demand of the First Amendment necessarily leaves all person to guess just
what the law really means to cover, and fear of a wrong guess inevitably

leads people to forego the very rights the Constitution sought to protect
above all others.
Id. at 137-38.
102. ParisAdult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 90. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
"[First Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society").

103. Cable operators are permitted to require certifications from access users
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section 10(c) clearly undermines the original intent of public ac°4
cess channels to be an outlet for unrestricted expression.
It is a fallacy to believe that the First Amendment was created with the expectation that all expression will be found agreeable
by everyone. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended that the First Amendment facilitate the dissemination of diverse views and ideas in order to ensure a healthy
democracy."0 5 By giving the cable operator the power to censor
material in a public forum, the FCC has encroached on one of the
most fundamental of all rights guaranteed under the U. S. Constitution - the right to free speech.
3. Institutional Stress
The third problem associated with the vagueness of the Miller standards concerns the "institutional stress" which has been
placed on the judiciary.' Because of the failure to define standards which are capable of being applied with any consistency by
state and lower federal courts, nearly every obscenity case raises
a constitutional question which must be dealt with by the Supreme Court itself."7 Justice Brennan explained this problem
by stating, "One cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so ...

The number of

obscenity cases on our docket gives ample testimony to the burden
that has been placed upon this Court."' Additionally, the Court

that their programming does not contain material proscribed under § 10(c). Second
Report and Order, supra note 66, 25. Under such a policy, cable operators may
request indemnification from access users for the costs of defending a prosecution
for carriage of an allegedly obscene program where the user has certified that the
program is not obscene. Id. at 23 n.13.
104. Congress intended public access to provide a public forum for free debate
and the open exchange of ideas. Rick K. Wilson, Meddling With Access Houston
Would Be Blow to Free Speech, Hous. CHRON., July 18, 1993, Outlook, at 5.
"Congress' recognition of free speech is embodied in its access channels. Congressional legislation (and subsequent court action) protects public opinion from the
intrusion of cable operators and franchisers alike." Id.
105. "The Constitution guarantees freedom of speech to promote the free exchange of ideas that is vital to a democratic society." Schwartz, supra note 6, at
1009. The First Amendment is vital to a healthy democracy because it protects
minority opinions. Wilson, supra note 104, at 5. "In democratic societies opinions
often clash ... [b]y ensuring a voice for the dissenter, the majority will always be
reminded of its fallibility. One hallmark of a democratic society is that all opinions
have the right to be heard and judged." Id.
106. ParisAdult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 91.
107. Justice Brennan stated that virtually every obscenity case "presents a constitutional question of exceptional difficulty." Id.
108. Id. at 92. In addition to the sheer number of cases and the necessity to
arrive at a difficult constitutional determination in each, Justice Brennan complained that the Court should not have to waste its time by viewing the allegedly
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has often been forced to resort to per curiam reversals or denials
of certiorari in order to deal with the tremendous volume of obscenity cases.1"9 By leaving lower court decisions intact, these
methods effectively censor expression which may be protected.1
Furthermore, the need for an independent determination by the
Court produces a continuing source of tension between state and
federal courts."'
The obscenity provision of section 10(c) will undoubtedly
compound the institutional stress placed on the judiciary. It is
important to note that all of the problems addressed by Justice
Brennan arose from the application of obscenity standards by
courts of law. If individual cable operators attempt to implement
the Miller standards, it is staggering to think of the enormous
potential for conflict. Hundreds, or even thousands, of new disputes over prohibited public access programming are likely to
inundate the court system. Cable operators may be subject to
lawsuits no matter what course of action they take." 2 These
cases will add to an already overburdened Supreme Court docket,
along with increasing the existing tension between state and federal courts.
The only thing clear about the Miller standards is that they
are exceedingly vague. As such, the standards have proven to be

obscene materials. Id. at 92-93 (stating that "it is hardly a source of edification to
the members of this Court who are compelled to view [the material] before passing
on its obscenity").
109. Id. at 93 (stating that relying on per curiam reversals or denials of certiorari "conceals the rationale of the decision and gives at least the appearance of
arbitrary action by the Court").
110. Id.
111. As for the cases which the Supreme Court does hear, the Court's inability to
justify its decisions with any consistent rationale creates the appearance of secondguessing state courts. See ParisAdult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 93.
112. There are two situations which will give rise to litigation. The first is where
a cable operator rejects a program based on content. The chief operating officer for
Media General Cable predicted that cable operators will be sued constantly under
the 1992 Cable Act. Laurie Kellman, Public-Access Cable Could Be Censored Under
a New Law, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1992, at B8. The official went on to say, "Who's
to say that I'm the arbiter of good taste? Someone's going to disagree with me. In
the long haul, it creates such aggravation for the people who franchise it that
they'll pull access programming." Id.
The second situation is where the cable operator airs a program which is
found to be obscene by viewers. Section 10(d) of the 1992 Cable Act amended § 638
of the Communications Act of 1934 by eliminating the immunity of cable operators
from criminal prosecution or civil liability for programs which contain obscene
material. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992). Section 638 of the Communications
Act of 1934 now provides that "cable operators shall not incur any ... liability for
any program carried on any channel designated for public, educational, [or) governmental use ... unless the program involves obscene material."Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 683 (1976) (emphasis added).
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extremely problematic in both theory and practice. In a deceptively simple statement, the FCC has ruled that the Miller standards
should guide the cable operator in deciding whether certain public
access programming is obscene. However, the Miller test is far
more confusing than helpful. It offers virtually no guidance to
courts of law, much less individual cable operators. The implementation of section 10(c)'s obscenity provision will have serious
repercussions reaching far beyond public access itself, ultimately
infringing upon the fundamental rights guaranteed under the
First Amendment.
B. The Sexually Explicit Conduct Provision of Section 10(c) is
Improperly Applied to Public Access

In addition to obscenity, section 10(c) also provides that a
cable operator may prohibit programming which contains "sexu-

ally explicit conduct" on PEG channels.' According to the FCC,
the definition of sexually explicit conduct is synonymous with that
of indecency as defined under section 10(a) of the Act.114 Thus,
for purposes of section 10(c), sexually explicit conduct is defined
as material "that depicts or describes sexual or excretory activities
in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary
community standards."1 '
This definition incorporates the terms "patently offensive"
and "contemporary community standards," and therefore brings
with it all of the problems associated with vagueness."' Nevertheless, this definition has recently withstood constitutional challenge, as applied to telephone communications, in Dial Information Services Corp. v. Thornburgh."' In Dial Information Ser-

113. Section 10(c) provides that a cable operator is authorized "to prohibit the
use ... of any channel capacity of any public, educational, or governmental access
facility for any programming which contains ... sexually explicit conduct . .. ."
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (emphasis added).
114. The FCC expressly rejected the contention that "sexually explicit conduct"
should be construed to mean "obscene." Second Report and Order, supra note 66,
14-15. The FCC stated that the underlying purpose of § 10, to reduce the exposure children to indecent programming on access channels, indicates that a construction of the term "sexually explicit conduct" to mean indecent programming is
reasonable. Id.
15. "[We believe that the same standard applicable under § 10(a)
and, as defined for us for purposes of § 10(b), should also govern cable operators'
determinations under § 10(c)." Id.
115. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, § 10(a), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
116. For a detailed analysis of the problems associated with the use of vague
terms, see supra Part II.A.1-3 of this Note.
117. 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991). The court held that this definition of obscenity
is "sufficien[t] ... to provide guidance to the person of ordinary intelligence in the
conduct of his affairs." Id. at 1541 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
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vices, the challenged statute prohibited providers of indecent telephone communications for commercial purposes from making their
services available to persons under eighteen years of age."' The
FCC has interpreted Dial Information Services to mean that similar standards may be applied to cable television." 9 However, the
courts have expressly rejected the application of indecency standards to cable television. 2 °
Despite the unwillingness of the courts to permit the application of indecency standards to cable, the FCC claims that the
definition of indecency as used in the 1992 Cable Act is constitutionally permissible because it represents a "compelling govern121
mental interest" and is "carefully tailored" to the medium.
104, 108 (1972)).

118. Id. at 1536. Known as the Helms Amendment to the Communications Act of
1934, the statute provides for fines of up to $50,000, imprisonment up to six
months, or both. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(b)-(c) (1989).
119. The FCC stated that Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
and its progeny, Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991) and
Information Providers' Coalition v. FCC, 928 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1991), "indicate
that regulation of indecent matter on other forms of expression is constitutionally
permissible provided that it meets the "compelling governmental interest" test and
is "carefully tailored." In re Implementation of Section 10 of the Cable Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, First Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 998, 1
10 (1993) [hereinafter First Report and Order].
120. See Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends, Part 11 - Interference
From the Indecency Cases?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 506 (1987) (discussing the
various cases which have expressly rejected the applicability of indecency standards to the cable medium). The Supreme Court first recognized the power of the
FCC to prohibit nonobscene, indecent speech in Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 438 U.S.
726 (1978). In Pacifica,The Pacifica Foundation, a not-for-profit owner of non-commercial radio stations, aired comedian George Carlin's infamous monologue featuring what he identified as seven "dirty" words: "shit," "piss," "fuck," "cunt,"
"cocksucker," "motherfucker," and "tits." Winer, supra, at 490 n.170. The Supreme
Court held that the FCC was not barred from sanctioning Pacifica for broadcasting
indecent, though not obscene, material over the radio. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at
750-51 (stating that "[wie simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig
has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on
proof that the pig is obscene."). The Supreme Court described indecent speech as
"expression which, although it may have social, political or artistic value, fails to
conform to accepted standards of morality." Mueller, supra note 1, at 1054 (discussing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-41).
However, in Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp.
1164, 1167 (D. Utah 1982), the court compared traditional broadcasting and cable
and concluded that the inherent differences preclude Pacifica's applicability to
cable. In Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125, 132 (S.D. Fla. 1983), affd, 755 F.2d 1415
(11th Cir. 1985), the Court stated that "[the] opportunity to completely avoid the
potential harm to minor or immature viewers sounds the death-knell of Pacifica's
applicability in the cable television context." Unlike the television viewer, the cable
subscriber may consult viewing guides, cancel his subscription at any time, or use
a free "lockbox" or "parental key" available from the cable company in order to
avoid offensive programming. Id. See infra Part III of this Note for a proposal to
eliminate § 10 of the 1992 Cable Act in favor of a lockbox approach.
121. See First Report and Order, supra note 119, I9 9-11 (discussing the permis-
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The asserted purpose underlying section 10 is to reduce the exposure of children to indecent programming.' 22 Indeed, few would

argue that this is not a compelling governmental interest. However, whether the definition of indecency adopted by the FCC is
carefully tailored to public access is another matter.
The FCC has attempted to group together two very different
types of access channels by applying the indecency standard of

section 10(a) to section 10(c). While the programming on leased
commercial access usually consists of various forms of advertis-

ing,12

all public

access programming

is noncommercial. 24

This distinction is legally significant in that the Supreme Court
affords a greater degree of protection to noncommercial speech
than to commercial speech.'2 5 Thus, by applying the indecency
standard of section 10(a), which governs leased commercial access,
to public access, the FCC has simply ignored this fundamental
rule of law.

Clearly, the FCC's current approach to implementing section
10(c) is riddled with problems. The stated purpose of the legis-

sibility of regulating indecent programming). In Sable Communications v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115 (1989), the Supreme Court held that "[tihe Government may...
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest." Id. at 126.
122. Id. at 6. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 10(c), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (providing that "the Commission shall promulgate regulations designed to limit the access of children to
indecent programming. . . ").Almost 15 years prior to the passage of the 1992 Cable Act, the FCC noted:
The concept of "indecent" is intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or
excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audiehce.
FCC Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 98 (1978).
123. Mueller, supra note 1, at 1066.
124. Id. at 1082. Public access channels consist solely of noncommercial programming and are provided without charge on a first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory basis. Id.
125. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 562 (1980) (stating that "our decisions have recognized 'the commonsense
distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other varieties of
speech."') (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
Accordingly, the Constitution affords less protection to commercial speech than to
noncommercial speech. Id. at 562-63. "With respect to noncommercial speech, [the
Supreme] Court has sustained content-based restrictions only in the most extraordinary circumstances .... In light of the greater potential for deception or
confusion in the context of certain advertising messages ... content-based restrictions on commercial speech may be permissible." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
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lation is to reduce the exposure of children to offensive programming on access channels.' However, this does not warrant the
intrusion upon the right of willing adults to produce, or to view,
such material. Fortunately, as the next section of this Note demonstrates, there is a less restrictive means to achieve this purpose.
III. THE PERFECT SOLUTION

The good news is that the seemingly insurmountable difficulties associated with the implementation of section 10(c) of the
1992 Cable Act in its present form can be completely avoided. It is
rare when technology is able to solve legal problems of this magnitude, but such is the case with offensive access programming.
Ironically, the comments to section 10(b) of the Act suggest the
answer -

lockboxes.

In proposing that section 10(c) be repealed in favor of a
lockbox approach, this section first responds to the various arguments asserted by the FCC in its previous rejection of
lockboxes.' 27 This section then addresses the economic aspects of
the lockbox approach. Finally, this section discusses the additional
benefits of lockboxes.
A. The Lockbox Arguments

While section 10(c) addresses PEG access programming, sections 10(a) and 10(b) apply to leased access channels. Section
10(a) of the Act authorizes cable operators voluntarily to enforce a
policy of prohibiting indecent programming on commercial leased
access channels on their systems. 128 Section 10(b) mandates that
126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the asserted governmental interest of reducing the exposure of children to offensive programming on
access channels).
127. The FCC expressly rejected lockboxes as an alternative means of reducing
children's exposure to indecent programming on leased commercial access. See
First Report and Order, supra note 119, I1112-17 (discussing the least restrictive
means issue).
128. Id. 1. Section 10(a) of the Act provides:
Sec. 10. CHILDREN'S PROTECTION FROM INDECENT PROGRAMMING
ON LEASED ACCESS CHANNELS.
(a) Authority to Enforce. Section 612(h) of the Communications Act of 1934

(47 U.S.C. § 532(h)) is amended (1) by inserting "or the cable operator" after "franchising authority"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following: "This subsection shall permit
a cable operator to enforce prospectively a written and published policy of
prohibiting programming that the cable operator reasonably believes describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards."
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 10(a), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
For purposes of the Act, "indecent" programming is defined as programming

The John MarshallLaw Review

[Vol. 28:2

any indecent programming which is not voluntarily prohibited by
the operator under section 10(a) must be placed on a single leased
access channel.'29 Further, the channel must be blocked by the
operator unless the cable subscriber requests access to the channel in writing. 3 °
In April of 1993, a conglomeration of public interest groups
known collectively as "Alliance" 3 ' challenged the constitutionality of section 10(b). Alliance argued that the blocking approach
chosen by the FCC is not the least restrictive means

available.

32

According to Alliance, the utilization of "lockboxes"

133
would be equally effective, yet less restrictive than blocking.

"that describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently
offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards." First Report and Order, supra note 119,
34. "The concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure of children to language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there
is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." FCC Memorandum
Opinion and Order, supra note 122, at 98.
However, "[c]able operators ... need not prohibit indecent programming but
are free to ban such programming on their commercial leased access channels as
long as they have a written and published policy and, in enforcing any such prohibition, exercise their reasonable belief about which programming is or is not indecent." First Report and Order, supra note 118,
32. Thus, the cable operator is
afforded wide discretion as to whether programming is classified as indecent. Id.
29.
129. Section 10(b) provides:
Communications Regulations. Section 612 of the Communications Act of
1934 (47 U.S.C. § 532) is amended by inserting after subsection (i) (as added
by subsection 9(c) of this Act) the following new subsection:
'(j)(1) Within 120 days following the date of this subsection, the Commission
shall promulgate regulations designed to limit the access of children to indecent programming, as defined by Commission regulations, and which
cable operators have not voluntarily prohibited under subsection (h) by (A) requiring cable operators to place on a single channel all indecent programs, as identified by program providers, intended for carriage on channels
designed for commercial use under this section;
(B) requiring cable operators to block such single channel unless the subscriber requests access to such channel in writing; and
(C) requiring programmers to inform cable operators if the program would
be indecent as defined by Commission regulations.
(2) Cable operators shall comply with the regulations promulgated pursuant
to paragraph (1).'
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, § 10(b), 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
130. Id. (providing that "cable operators [are required] to block such single channel unless the subscriber requests access to such channel in writing").
131. The Alliance for Community Media, the Alliance for Communications Democracy, the American Civil Liberties Union, and People for the American Way are
referred to jointly as "Alliance." First Report and Order, supra note 119, app. B.
132. Id.
3, 12.
133. Id.
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A lockbox is a simple device which allows the subscriber to select
the programming to be blocked out.'34 Though not a novel
idea, 3 ' the FCC summarily rejected lockboxes in favor of the
current blocking approach by which the cable operator decides
whether programming may be aired.'3 6
1. The FCC's Rationale Is Inapplicable To Public Access
In support of its decision, the FCC relied on Dial Information
Services Corp. v. Thornburgh.3 ' In Dial Information Services,
the Second Circuit held that a pre-subscription blocking approach
was the least restrictive means to reduce children's access to indecent telephone communications. 138 The Court declared the approach to be an ineffective means, citing the fact that only four
percent of residential telephone lines had 1been
blocked in the two
39
years central blocking had been available.
This rationale, while perhaps sound as applied to telephone
communications, is misplaced with respect to public access. First,
the central blocking system at issue in Dial Information Services
is different than the lockbox approach in certain important respects. The central blocking process involved the assignment of a

134. Id.
3 n.4. The term lockbox refers to two different systems. Some cable
systems offer devices the sole function of which is to block out channels. Id. However, the regular cable tuners which most cable systems currently use have the

additional capability of blocking out channels through the use of a "Parental Authorization" feature. See, e.g., SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC., SERIEs 8580 SET-ToP
TERMINAL USER'S GUIDE, PUB. No. 69T147B, PART No. 232139 18 (1988) (discussing the "Parental Authorization" feature).
135. The courts are aware of such devices. See Cruz v. Ferre, 571 F. Supp. 125,
132 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (noting that "to protect children or other immature viewers
from unsuitable programming, subscribers need only use a free 'lockbox' or 'parental key' available from [the cable operator]"). Congress is not only aware of lockbox
technology, but has even gone so far as to require cable operators to provide
lockboxes, upon request, to their subscribers in order to restrict the viewing of
obscene or indecent programming on premium cable channels such as Home Box
Office or Showtime. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §
544(d)(2)(A) (1985). However, the lockbox requirements do not apply to PEG access
channels. Winer, supra note 120, at 511 n.282.
136. See generally First Report and Order, supra note 119, 1912-17 (addressing
the least restrictive means issue).
137. 938 F.2d 1535 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
138. First Report and Order, supra note 119,
13 (citing Dial Information Services, 938 F.2d at 1542). Under the "central blocking" approach at issue in Dial
Information Services, telephone subscribers could request that the telephone company block access to sexually explicit telephone services. Dial Information Services,
938 F.2d at 1541. The Court concluded that central blocking was not as effective as
the "pre-subscription" approach, which is similar in principle to the method currently employed under § 10(b) of the 1992 Cable Act. Id. at 1542.
139. Dial Information Services, 938 F.2d at 1542. The Court also relied on an
'awareness study" which revealed that half of the residential households in New
York were unaware of sexually explicit telephone services or central blocking. Id.
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three digit prefix to the phone numbers of sexually explicit telephone services. 140 When parents received a telephone bill, they
would be put on notice that a child was making calls to these
services and could request central blocking."' Under the lockbox
approach, every cable subscriber would be asked if they wanted a
lockbox as part of their basic cable package. The cable operator
would be required to furnish a lockbox to every subscriber who
requested one. Therefore, unlike the central blocking system in
Dial Information Services, all cable subscribers would be made
fully aware of the availability of lockboxes.'
Second, sexually explicit telephone communications and public access programming are two entirely different media. Such
telephone services are businesses exclusively engaged in providing
various forms of "phone sex" for profit. 143 In contrast, public access channels are nonprofit and exist solely to provide a forum for
noncommercial programming. 44 Public access channels and sexually explicit telephone services cannot be rationally equated.
Thus, the attempt by the FCC to use the rationale of Dial Information Services to support its decision is illogical, particularly in
light of the fact that
each medium of expression requires individu1 45
alized treatment.

2. Lockboxes Are Simple To Operate
The FCC also identified what it considered to be another
drawback of the lockbox approach. The FCC felt that lockboxes

140. Id. at 1541.

141. Id. at 1541-42.
142. In Dial Information Services, the Court reasoned that the low percentage of
households which were aware of central blocking rendered the approach ineffective.
Id. at 1542.
143. The statute at issue in Dial Information Services prohibited "providers of indecent telephone communications for commercial purposes" from making their
services available to minors. Dial Information Services, 938 F.2d at 1536 (emphasis
added). Although the plaintiffs-appellees described themselves as "electronic publishers" and "information providers," the Court characterized them as "purveyors of
pornography" and referred to the services collectively as "dial-a-porn." Id. at 1537.
144. See Wilson, supra note 104, at 5 (stating that "[Congress] reserved [public
access] to provide a public forum in which citizens could exercise their rights to
free speech").
145. "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself and that law
must reflect the 'differing natures, values, abuses and natures' of each method."
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981); see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each medium of expression ... must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it,
for each may present its own problems."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748 (1978) ("We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems."); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
503 (1952) ("Each method tends to present its own peculiar problems.").
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were too difficult to install, activate and deactivate in the attempt
to block out offensive programming. 4 6 However, this speculation
is based upon a misunderstanding of lockbox technology. A
lockbox is no more difficult to install than a regular cable tuner. 47 Professional installers employed by the cable system are
capable of making any necessary equipment changes. To operate a
lockbox, the user need only punch in a private code or turn a key,
48
depending on the system, to lock or unlock specific channels.
Lockboxes enable the parent to block out any channels, access or
otherwise, in a matter of seconds before leaving a minor unsupervised. 4 ' When desired, such channels can be reactivated just as
easily. 50 Accordingly, there is little merit to the argument that
lockboxes are too difficult to install and operate.
3. The Lockbox Approach Is Economically Viable
Cable companies may object to the lockbox requirements as
imposing an unreasonable economic burden on them. However,
most cable systems already have lockbox technology in place.' 5 '
Cable subscribers on systems which do not currently offer such
capabilities could help subsidize the cost of the devices through
slightly increased subscription rates.'52 More significantly, by
preventing the inevitable lawsuits challenging the current version
of section 10(c), the lockbox approach has the potential to save
cable companies millions in legal fees. 53 These savings alone
will more than make up for any additional costs which the cable
systems are forced to bear.
B. Additional Benefits
The lockbox approach is not merely less restrictive than the
FCC's rules, it completely avoids the problems associated with

146. First Report and Order, supra note 119, 1 15. The FCC contended that since
offensive programming may be shown randomly under the lockbox approach, subscribers would likely forego receiving access programming entirely by leaving the
lockbox activated permanently. Id.
147. See SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC., supra note 134, at 18 (providing instructions
for installation of unit).

148. Winer, supra note 120, at 516.
149. See SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA, INC., supra note 134, at 8-9 (providing instructions
for activating and deactivating the "Parental Authorization" feature).
150. Id.
151. See supra note 134 (stating that the cable tuners which most cable systems
currently use incorporate a "Parental Authorization" feature).
152. All subscribers to cable systems which offer premium cable channels currently subsidize lockboxes which must be provided pursuant to § 544(d)(2)(A) of the
1984 Cable Act. Winer, supra note 120, at 517 n.299.
153. See supra Part II.A.3 of this Note for a discussion of the inevitable litigation
which will result under the current version of § 10(c) of the 1992 Cable Act.
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giving the power of censorship to the cable operator. 5 4 Since the
cable operator will not be forced to decide whether certain programming is obscene or indecent, the vagueness of these standards will no longer be a concern.
Furthermore, the lockbox approach is more effective than the
FCC rules. By transferring the power of censorship from the cable
operator to the cable subscriber, concerned parents are given total
control over the programming their children may view. Certainly,
not every parent will agree with a cable operator regarding what
constitutes appropriate programming for their children. Thus,
lockboxes provide parents with a level of flexibility and control
which the FCC rules simply cannot match.
CONCLUSION

There is no question that the exposure of children to offensive
programming is a legitimate concern. However, this concern does
not justify section 10(c)'s encroachment on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the First Amendment. The FCC has promulgated rules which undermine the very concept of public access
as a forum for free expression.
The FCC rules implementing section 10(c) are on very tenuous constitutional grounds. In November of 1993, a three-judge
panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ruled that the Act's ban on indecent material violates
the First Amendment. 5 ' Fortunately, there is a better alternative.
This Note proposes that the FCC adopt a lockbox approach to
reduce the exposure of children to offensive programming on access channels. The lockbox approach avoids all the problems associated with putting cable operators in the untenable position of
deciding whether certain programming is obscene or indecent.
Furthermore, lockboxes offer parents greater control over their
children's viewing habits than do the FCC rules.
The responsibility of preventing the exposure of children to
offensive programming lies with parents, not cable operators. The

154. See supra Part II of this Note for a discussion of the problems with § 10(c).
155. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 10 F.3d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
This ruling has since been vacated by the full Court of Appeals pending rehearing
en banc. Alliance for Community Media, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
But cf Altmann v. Television Signal Corp., 849 F. Supp. 1335, 1345 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (holding the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' stay is not binding on the
Ninth Circuit).
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lockbox approach gives parents the ability to meet this responsibility, while preserving the unique medium of public
access 156
"the electronic realization of the First Amendment."
Bradley J. Howard

156. Kellman, supra note 112, at B8.

